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ABSTRACT: This paper makes the case for a realignment in the discourse and conceptualisation of community 
management of rural water supply. It draws on data from 20 case studies of reportedly successful community 
management programmes from India to argue that current discourse is remiss not to describe the substantial role 
of the state and other supporting agencies in financing and supporting service provision. In the context of such 
substantial levels of support, conceptually, it is argued that the tendency to treat the challenge of rural water 
supply as one of either a community participation or collective action problem that only the community can 
address further limits current thinking in this area. Recasting the primary challenge of rural water service delivery 
as improved cooperation and coordination between state and citizen, the paper proposes a more substantial 
focus on coproduction as a route to overcome sustainability problems in rural water supply. The paper ends by 
reflecting on the generalisability of this thinking noting the specific context of the Indian empirical data. It 
concludes by arguing that, although certain aspects of the study are specific to that empirical domain, the 
normative and conceptual reasons for shifting the discourse remain applicable in broader contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper makes the case for a discursive and conceptual realignment in the study of the world’s most 
common rural water supply management model – the community management approach. The 
backdrop is the long-standing concern with the lack of operational sustainability in rural water supply 
(Saunders and Warford, 1976; Paul, 1987; David et al., 2009; Schweitzer and Mihelcic, 2012) and, 
relatedly, the critiques of the community management model (Baumann, 2006; Harvey and Reed, 2006; 
Moriarty al.; 2013). In recent years, a simmering level of dissatisfaction with community management 
has seemingly boiled over into outright rejection of the model as a valid approach to managing rural 
water supply, at least in the academic literature (Broek and Brown, 2015; Chowns, 2015; Whaley and 
Cleaver, 2017). In an earlier paper, it was noted that, despite a critique, it is useful to reflect that 
community management has played a significant role as the world achieved the Millennium 
Development Goal for water supply and there remain many successful examples of it working in 
practice (Hutchings et al., 2015). This paper continues in that sympathetic regard. It is not a defence of 
community management as an approach but rather an attempt to highlight how we may traverse the 
contemporary malaise about the model through recasting how we conceptualise and discursively label 
the approach so as to deliver more productive rural water supply solutions going forward. 
In a recent review, Whaley and Cleaver (2017) highlighted two major bodies of critique stemming 
from what they classified as practice-based and critical-academic perspectives. The practice-based 
literature focuses on the inadequacies of the model from a managerial perspective. For example, it 
argues the financial viability of the approach is one of the major barriers to operational sustainability 
(Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Moriarty et al., 2013). In an often quoted heuristic about the financing of 
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community management programmes, it is said that communities should cover the operational costs of 
supply as well as 10% of capital costs (Joshi, 2003), and whilst the specific amounts may vary, the notion 
that communities cover a significant proportional of costs is commonly associated with this approach 
(Moriarty et al., 2013). Yet the fundamental problem is that tariffs rarely cover the full costs of supply 
and so without further support the financing of the system becomes unviable (Franceys et al., 2016; 
Marks and Davis, 2012). The critical academic perspectives further reinforce such critiques by calling 
into question what they consider to be a naively apolitical approach to community management around 
the world (Whaley and Cleaver, 2017). Too often, programmes lack sensitivity to local customs and 
informal institutional functioning, completely ignoring the reality of power-relations on the ground 
leading to dismal outcomes such as a reinforcement of inequities within communities (Srivastava, 
2012). 
Both these critical-academic and practice-based literatures do coalesce on the view that thinking 
about community management should encapsulate and embed village-level institutions within a 
broader landscape (Whaley and Cleaver, 2017). This is seen through the calls for 'community 
management plus' a phrase coined by Baumann (2006) with the 'plus' signifying the ongoing support 
from government or other agencies that is required to ensure that community management is 
sustainable. This is in addition to the broader movement to understand and empower effective 
'enabling support environments' as part of a broader service delivery approach to rural water supply, 
with the enabling support environment representing those organisations, whether public, private or 
not-for-profit, that "help communities in addressing issues they cannot reasonably solve on their own 
and gradually improve their performance in their service provider functions" (Lockwood and Smits, 
2011: 22-23). It is also seen from the critical-academic perspective, in the need to "analyse governance 
dynamics beyond the domain of the village or community in order to understand a committee’s 
capacity to function" (Whaley and Cleaver, 2017: 60). This work recognises the importance of 
understanding how power-relations beyond the village level shape the ability of a particular water 
committee to be effective. From either perspective there is an explicit realisation that what happens 
beyond the community matters. 
Building on that theme, this paper argues for a discursive and conceptual realignment of community 
management that better takes into account these extra-community aspects. It does this by first 
highlighting the associated connection between community management and community participation, 
and the somewhat related conflation between the community-based management of natural resources 
(CBMNR) and the community management of rural water supply. Arguing that the collective action 
problems inherent in the CBMNR literature and empowerment challenges from participatory 
development are qualitatively different to the contemporary rural water supply challenge, the paper 
introduces thinking regarding the co-production of (public) services as a more useful conceptual frame 
for community management. It then presents an overview of findings from an empirical study in India 
that documents 20 cases of reportedly successful community management programmes. In that study, 
the level of support from the state and other enabling support agencies is so substantial that describing 
it as a form of community management is only a very partial description that is poorly captured by the 
label: 'community management'. The paper ends by reflecting on the generalisability of this thinking, 
noting the specific context of the Indian empirical data. It concludes by arguing that, although certain 
aspects of the study are specific to that empirical domain, the normative and conceptual reasons for 
shifting the discourse remain applicable in broader contexts. 
PARTICIPATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COPRODUCTION 
This section discusses two of the major conceptual bodies of literature through which community 
management has been studied, including CBMNR and participatory development. It begins by 
emphasising a link that is often made between debates about community management of rural water 
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supply and the literature on CBMNR (Hope, 2015). There is a considerable body of work that can be 
described under CBMNR that uses different labels such as community-based resource management 
(Armitage, 2005; Blaikie, 2006; Leach et al., 1999) and common-pool resource management (Blaikie, 
2006; Dynamics and Berkes, 2006). At the core of these works is the management of 'the commons' 
which can be described in the neoclassical terminology of economics as common-pool resources that 
are non-excludable and rivalrous (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). However, more practically, much of this 
work focuses on the management of resources from which excluding potential appropriators is difficult, 
at least in the absence of state involvement or organised cooperation among users. In this sense, the 
basic problem that literature engages with can be characterised as different forms of the 'collective 
action problem' – for example, it investigates whether communities can avoid free-riding by individuals 
within their group (Olson, 2002; Ostrom, 1990, 2010). The most famous perspective to emerge from 
this literature is Ostrom’s (1990) thesis on governing the commons. Through this and subsequent work, 
she has developed eight design principles that typified successful collective management systems 
(Ostrom, 1990; Cox and Arnold, 2010) which have since been further developed, tested and critiqued in 
a considerable number of works (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997; Dynamics and Berkes, 2006; Cox and 
Arnold, 2010; Cleaver, 2012).  
This type of thinking has been linked with community management of rural water supply in other 
studies in part, it is contended, because it provides theoretical and methodological approaches for 
understanding the functioning of community institutions (e.g. Chowns, 2014; Jones, 2015). Yet the 
characterisation of rural water supply as non-excludable and therefore a common-pool resource is 
considered problematic. While developing this argument it is important to stress two points of 
clarification. The first is that this paper focuses on the management of domestic rural water supplies, 
rather than productive supplies for irrigation or the like, which are likely to remain usefully analysed as 
collective action problems. The second is that on a normative level the provision of water is a human 
right (United Nations, 2010) and, in this sense, is non-excludable, but in practice community 
management institutions are set up to manage specific water supply infrastructure assets which 
increasingly include piped networks to only some homes in a village, with other homes relying on 
private or alternative supplies. In this context, the services are excludable, and the specific challenges 
are not so much avoiding free-riding or the collective exhaustion of a common resource, but rather 
operating a quasi-professional organisation that brings together sufficient technical expertise and 
administrative capability to manage and renew the infrastructure so as to ensure water is delivered ad 
infinitum. In the words of Lockwood and Smits (2011) communities (or rather those involved in the 
water committees) must develop the "sense of being a service provider". 
Another trend within the literature is to see community management as a subset of broader 
community participation processes. This may be because the emergence of community management 
from the 1990s onwards followed the broader trend to see community participation as the engine of 
development programmes and projects. In this sense, the concept of participation has been given as 
part of the justification for community management (Harvey and Reed, 2006), especially in the early 
literature (Paul, 1987; McCommon et al., 1990). Participation is itself a controversial subject with 
various definitions related to the idea of citizen empowerment (Brown and Ashman, 1996; Frances 
Cleaver, 1999; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Hickey and Mohan, 2005). On a 
practical level, the efficacy of participatory development in terms of delivering lasting and equitable 
development outcomes is highly questionable (White et al., 2018). In the water sector, the prevailing 
levels of unsustainablity in services in places such as sub-Saharan Africa where participation has been a 
policy focus have led to an increasing scepticism about the relationship between highly participatory 
rural water services and the long-term sustainability of services (Jones, 2011; Marks and Davis, 2012; 
Broek and Brown, 2015). In the context of this paper, the emphasis on participation as a frame for 
thinking through community management is considered limited. On the one hand, it emphasises the 
importance of local control and action, but with that comes the notion that it is the responsibility of the 
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communities to take meaningful action, without highlighting the roles and responsibilities of other 
actors. For this reason, it is considered to lead to a too narrow focus of concern with what happens 
within communities rather than a broader systemic perspective on communities as part of a wider 
support system. 
Considering these, a more productive focus is thought to exist by focusing on the quality of the inter-
organisational partnerships between a water committee (representing a limited number of organised 
citizens operating in a quasi-professional manner) and the broader supporting organisations, with the 
success of these arrangements determined by whether the needs of individual citizens across the 
community are being met in an equitable and satisfactory way. This conceptualisation would mean 
community management of domestic water supply is more usefully analysed in a similar way to other 
forms of service delivery, rather than as a subset of the broader common-pool management of water 
resources or community empowerment initiatives. In work focused on urban sanitation services, 
McGranahan (2015) and McGranaham and Mitlin  (2016) have highlighted the distinction between 
collective-action problems and what they describe as a coproduction challenge. For them, the 
coproduction challenge is focused more prominently on building cooperation and coordination 
between the state and citizen, compared to the conventional starting point of citizen-citizen interaction 
in collective-action problems. 
Similarly, in the particular context of domestic rural water supplies, it is argued that it is now more 
useful to frame community management as an arrangement between state (or other supporting 
agency) and citizens for delivering (public) services rather than conceptualise it using tools designed to 
study common-pool resource management or participatory development. In an analysis of how basic 
services are often managed in low- and middle-income countries, Joshi and Moore (2004: 144) 
emphasise the increasing importance of inter-organisational partnerships in service delivery and 
develop the concept of 'institutionalised coproduction', which they define as: "the provision of public 
services through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of 
citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions" (p. 40). This shares similarities with 
Ostrom’s (1996) work on co-production in which she noted how individuals from different organisations 
often feed into the production of public goods and services as part of a poly-centric governance 
systems. 
However, in the work of Joshi and Moore (2004), they focus more explicitly on the service delivery 
challenge, noting their notion of institutionalising co-production has four specific characteristics: 1) 
partnerships should not be temporary; 2) partnerships should not necessarily need to rely on formal 
contractual arrangements (although they can do); 3) partnerships often reflect a blurring of boundaries 
between public and private; and, 4) they "do not particularly associate institutionalised co-production 
with what Hood (1998) categorises as the egalitarian (participatory, communitarian) approach to 
dealing with public management issues" (Joshi and Moore, 2004: 40). This final point is thought to 
mean this conceptualisation has not been widely applied to the community management model, which 
has conventionally been associated with participatory development (Harvey and Reed, 2006). However, 
in the context of greater emphasis on the extra-community aspects of community management, the 
idea of co-production is considered to become more appropriate for describing the forms of service 
delivery that are being called for, such as community management plus. In practice, as will be argued in 
the following sections, they are already accurate in explaining the contemporary forms of service 
delivery found in supposedly community management programmes in India. And, finally, even beyond 
India, it will be further argued that such ideas hold normative resonance for application as they more 
clearly emphasise the responsibility of governments and other supporting agencies within service 
delivery processes. 
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INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT IN INDIA 
The empirical material presented in this sections comes from a study into community management 
programmes from India conducted between 2013 and 2016, which has been presented in full alongside 
the methodology elsewhere (Hutchings et al., 2017). This section re-outlines the study design and 
approach, highlights the key aspects for the data presented in this paper, and then describes the 
results. 
Study design and approach 
The overall study involved a purposive selection of 20 community-management case studies of 
community-management programmes across states with different levels of wealth and geographical 
contexts. Cases were selected based on assessment of relative success within the operating context 
with pilot visits to confirm suitability of each case in terms of representing an operational programme 
(see Annex for an overview of cases). Five fieldwork teams delivered the case studies using a 
standardised methodology that involved key informant interviews, focus groups, household surveys 
and administrative records. The combined data set consisted of 2355 household surveys, 272 
interviews and 130 focus groups that were gathered from 80 villages (four per case). The aim was to 
gather information on how the programmes operated, what service levels they delivered and the 
financing mechanisms found in the programmes. This section focuses primarily on the financial and 
institutional analyses from that larger study. 
Key informant interviews, focus group discussions and administrative records were the key data 
sources for the financial analyses. Field researchers triangulated data from these sources into summary 
financial resource tables for each case study, covering: one-off Capital Expenditure (CapEx) and then 
the ongoing, annual Recurrent Expenditure made up of Operational Expenditure (OpEx) and Capital 
Maintenance Expenditure (CapManEx). Where necessary, costs were standardised to 2016 levels using 
a mixed inflation index – capital costs following the Construction Price Index and the operational costs 
following the Consumer Price Index, both of the Reserve Bank of India (Reserve Bank of India, 2015). 
Prices were converted into USD from INR using the Purchasing Power Parity conversion factors 
provided by the World Bank. A key aspect of the financial analysis was to assess the balance between 
the costs covered directly by communities through their tariff contributions and costs covered either 
directly or indirectly by supporting organisations across the case studies. 
The institutional analysis followed a similar approach in focusing on the comparative analysis of 
roles and responsibilities between the community and higher-level supporting entities. Key informant 
interviews, focus group discussions and administrative records were again the main sources of data for 
the institutional analysis in each case study report. For those reports, the data were processed into a 
series of scoring frameworks that, for example, provided an assessment of the level of community 
participation during key stages of water supply management (e.g. the level of community participation 
during the implementation of a new project versus its ongoing management) as well as descriptions of 
the institutional arrangements found. Individual case study reports were then analysed together in 
comparative frameworks to support the synthesis process. This followed the principles advocated by 
Ritchie et al. (2013) in large-scale qualitative policy research in which the process of summarising case 
study features promotes learnings and research insights about key trends and patterns. A process of 
classification was also applied to the organisational arrangements found in each case study. This 
involved developing typologies that covered the organisational forms described in the reports and then 
allocating the case studies within these groups, with the main groups reported in the empirical results 
section below. 
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Summary of major findings 
This section summarises findings from that larger study to illustrate the particular nature of community 
management found in India. The intention is not to provide a detailed analysis of factors that may 
determine different financial resource-sharing arrangements or to try to answer whether particular 
institutional forms are more effective than others, which are issues explored in the broader work. 
Rather, the data are presented here to demonstrate the validity of conceptualising the studied 
programmes as forms of co-production, as per the criteria outlined by Joshi and Moore (2004), 
described above. With the cases covering programmes from 17 of India’s 29 states, including both 
government and NGO initiatives, the approach is considered to allow a level of generalisation to be 
gathered from the findings in terms of reflecting contemporary trends in India during the study period. 
The focus is first on describing the type of institutional arrangements found across the cases which can 
be classified into two main organisational arrangements: 'community management through local self-
government' and 'community management through societies'. A description of each is now presented 
before a discussion of their distribution across the cases. 
To understand the local self-government model, it is helpful to explain the structure and ethos of 
public administration in rural India. It revolves around the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRI) – a three-tier 
system of local self-government that has at its lowest level a Gram Panchayat which operates at (or 
close to) the village scale. Under this system, statutory responsibility is given to the Gram Panchayats 
for delivering most public services, however contemporary policy (in particular the National Rural 
Water Drinking Programme (Government of India, 2013)) dictates that for rural water supply it 
establishes a semi-independent Village Water and Sanitation Committee (VWSC) that comprises a 
mixture of Gram Panchayat employees and private citizens to take on this role. This organisational form 
is shaped by the principles of community management; however, the case studies from this study 
indicate that in practice the most critical roles of the VWSCs are fulfilled by the elected representatives 
or employees of the Gram Panchayat. For example, the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat acts as the 
treasurer of the VWSC, whilst the Gram Panchayat Sarpanch (President) is mandated to be the chair of 
the VWSC. This means the organisation is driven by the priorities of the local self-government system 
rather than reflecting some form of bottom-up collective organisation of community members (an 
organigram of the model is illustrated in Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Organigram of community management through local self-government model. 
 
The formal aspects of the societies-based model is best understood by explaining The Indian Societies 
Registration Act (Government of India, 1860), which dictates that all charitable bodies should be 
registered with government and have a specified management board and a set of agreed rules and 
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regulations. A Registered Society can open an independent bank account and have official (i.e. 
contractual) agreements with government entities to deliver services which are constitutionally the 
responsibility of the government. In this way, VWSCs can be established as Registered Societies in 
programmes and can take on the statutory responsibility for managing domestic water from the Gram 
Panchayat. In such cases, the VWSC have some level of independence from the government system but 
they can only operate with explicit permission of the Gram Panchayat. The case studies indicate that 
although this means the Registered Societies are distinct organisational bodies many of the substantive 
management functions that a VWSC must undertake remain dependent on the Gram Panchayat. For 
example, in a situation when some form of support is needed from government (e.g. for a major repair) 
this must be channelled through the Gram Panchayat system and the support that comes (often in the 
form of financial support) will be paid initially into the Gram Panchayat bank accounts. Ultimately, in 
practice, decision-making power remains embedded within the local self-government system (an 
organigram of the model is illustrated in Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Organigram of community management through societies model. 
 
As can be gathered from the overview in the annex, the societies’ model was found in each of the five 
NGO programmes covered in this study, with none of these programmes working through the LSG 
approach. However, across government programmes (15 case studies in total), there was a mixture 
between both models. In eight government programmes what was found was the local self-government 
model whereas in seven what was found was the registered societies’ model. This is considered to 
reflect the devolution of water to the state level which leads to different interpretations of guidelines 
to emerge between state agencies. The specific reasons why one or another model is adopted within 
government programmes across the states has been linked to the underlying political economy of 
devolution within each state (Hutchings et al., 2017). However, in both situations, the role of Gram 
Panchayats in taking many of the critical responsibilities for supply or, at least, being the avenue 
through which significant resources were channelled to VWSCs, meant that government was playing a 
significant role in the everyday management of water supply across all the community management 
programmes. 
This sharing of responsibility becomes even more explicit when considering the sharing of financial 
costs between communities and the enabling support environment. Focusing on capital costs, the data 
from this study indicates that there is no standard model of community contribution for capital costs 
with significant variability in the proportion of costs covered across the cases (Figure 3). In four of the 
cases, mostly from the poorer states, the programmes have moved away from expecting any form of 
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community contribution to capital costs whilst in six cases, the contribution from the community is 5% 
or lower. Focusing on recurrent financing, Figure 4 illustrates the level of recurrent financial support 
underpinning many of the programmes. Again, there is no standard model across the cases but on 
average, under the local self-government model, financial support covers an average of 52% of the 
recurrent costs of supply with the rest is financed directly through community tariffs. Even for the 
community management through societies’ approach financial support covers 42% with the remainder 
coming from community tariffs. Recognising that there is variability across the case studies, the 
consistent pattern remains of significant recurrent financing of rural water supply. 
Figure 3. Contribution of enabling support entities to capital expenditure across the case studies. 
 
Figure 4. contribution of enabling support entities to recurrent financing across the case studies. 
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From the results it is clear that the modes of service delivery documented throughout that study 
exhibited institutional and financial costing arrangements that reflected a balance of recurrent inputs 
from the state (or other agencies) and communities. The institutional arrangements also reflect a 
significant overlap of community and public institutions. In explaining the arrangements, it is tempting 
to be still limited by a binary discourse with a continued emphasis on either describing it as a form of 
community management where the community takes the lead (e.g. the Societies model), or in cases 
where Gram Panchayats are more prominent, then a form of direct public provision (Rout, 2014). Yet 
the reality is a more nuanced situation with VWSCs working within, alongside and with approval from 
local self-government in all the programmes captured in this study. At a broad level, this reflects the 
point made by Ostrom (1996) in her work on co-production about not reifying the public and private 
divide within conceptual and practical thinking about natural resources management problems. 
Similarly, in these cases of rural water supply management, such binary categories become inadequate 
and hence the need for alternatives. 
As explained earlier, Joshi and Moore (2004: 50) develop four particular characteristics they used to 
characterise their specific definition of 'institutionalised coproduction', which they argue is particularly 
common in developing countries. These include: 1) service delivery that involves substantial resource 
contribution from the state and private citizens; 2) service delivery based on long-term relationships 
between the involved parties; 3) service delivery that has the potential for informal arrangements 
governing those relationships; and, 4) service delivery that involves a blurring of distinctions between 
the traditional divide of public and private actors. Taking each point in turn: first, the evidence 
presented reflects the sharing of financial resource contribution; second, the programmes studied also 
had an average length of continuous operation of seven years (see annex) supporting the notion that 
the arrangements reflect long-term commitments; third, the informality criteria were not assessed in 
this research which focused more strongly on the formal institutional structures. However, informality 
is positioned as a tendency rather than a rule and this is, therefore, not considered to invalidate the 
applicability of the concept; and, fourth, the blurring of the private and public divide is considered a 
hallmark of both models described with significant overlap between individual’s roles within the state 
system and the VWSCs. In summary, the main forms of service delivery studied could accurately be 
described as co-production as per the ideas of Joshi and Moore (2004). 
UNDERSTANDING COPRODUCTION IN INDIA 
In making the argument that these forms of service delivery are better described as co-production 
rather than community management, the author is cognisant about the risks of introducing a label that 
defies easy categorisation and boundary. Community management has emerged to become a sort of 
umbrella term to describe what can be extremely variable practices. In an earlier paper there was an 
attempt to introduce some more granulated terms to reflect difference in community roles, with the 
labels being: direct provision with community involvement, community management with direct 
support and professionalised community-based management (Hutchings et al., 2017). Equally, there are 
other forms of rural water service delivery models ranging from direct local government provision, 
public utility provision, private-sector provision and supported self-supply (World Bank, 2017), each 
with its own characteristics. In this regard, further work is needed to precisely clarify the characteristics 
and boundaries of co-production (and perhaps different forms of co-production) yet that is considered 
a distinct contribution to this paper. The major point here was to highlight the high-level utility of co-
production as an umbrella term to describe what is often described as community management in 
India. As will be argued, this is not only on the ground of improved accuracy but also because of its 
normative value in using a concept that conveys the shared responsibility for service provision between 
citizens and the state (or other enabling support entities, such as NGOs). 
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Some further points of clarification are useful to stress here when interpreting these findings. First, 
it is acknowledged that co-production is more than co-financing but involves both parties actively 
involved in the production process of a service. In this sense, the financial data are one example of this 
but the involvement of both organised citizens and state employees involved in the running of the 
water systems, as per the institutional models described, is another element of this arrangement. 
Second, that community management and coproduction are not mutually exclusive, and community 
management can even happen within a co-production system if organised groups of citizens take on 
the management of part of a system. However, by describing it as community management it is only 
telling part of the story, and that community management should be embedded within a broader 
process of co-production. In this sense, community management can still happen within a broader 
process of co-production but it is the focus on that larger endeavour, discursively, conceptually and in a 
policy context, which is considered important and which I hope a new discourse may be able to help to 
move towards. 
Building on that evidence, it is now argued for the need to reset the discourse of community 
management to one of 'co-production'. This is to not only promote a more accurate discourse but one 
that fairly attributes the reality of shared responsibility between state and citizen that is the hallmark of 
the programmes studied. This forms an attempt to bypass terms like community management or 
community management plus, which promote a sense of equivocation or, even, contradiction when 
used by governments, NGOs and donors to describe the programmes that they deliver. Yet in doing so it 
is important to note some limitations on these claims and, therefore, help provide greater clarity on 
how and why this situation has emerged in India and whether it is applicable in broader contexts. It is 
clear that the precise modes of co-production described in the case studies are shaped by the particular 
nature of Indian devolution. This makes direct comparisons to other national contexts limited in many 
regards. However, it does point to a more subtle implication of the study which is how community 
management has been adapted within an Indian context. In particular, the model has been integrated 
within and transformed by the political economy of rural administration, especially the Panchayat Raj 
system of devolution. This is considered an important point because a common mechanism of failure 
within the global development sector is the uncritical transfer of blueprint models from one context to 
another, without appropriate local adaptation (Scott, 1998; Pritchett et al., 2013). A recent critical 
paper on community management has even stated the model represents an international "blueprint for 
breakdown" that has become poorly implemented in many contexts (Broek and Brown, 2015). 
This poses a related question – how and why has India avoided this blueprint adoption of 
community management failure and seemingly undertaken a process of appropriate adaptation 
towards co-production? First, it is worth noting that many of these changes have undoubtedly been 
enabled by the growing levels of wealth that have developed, albeit unevenly, across India. The country 
has become richer with per capita GDP (PPP) doubling in the past decade from around USD3000 (2006) 
to over USD6000 (2016) (World Bank, 2016) and this wealth will be enabling the state to more easily 
fund the subsidies going into the water sector. This situation is unfortunately not replicated in some of 
the lower income countries that also have widespread use of community management. Yet it is 
contended the Indian situation is also shaped by more ideological drivers that mean community 
management became framed not in opposition to the state but rather as an approach that is 
compatible with the local self-government system. This makes the narrative of community 
management in India qualitatively different to what could be described as the generic international 
narrative. 
In the international arena, the justification for community management is that it is often an 
alternative to deficient public provision (Harvey and Reed, 2006; Broek and Brown, 2015) with the 
principle that NGOs could help facilitate community participation as some kind of replacement for 
public-sector involvement. Yet in India, the very notion of the local self-government system is that it 
reflects the political ideology of Swajal (Johnson et al., 2005; Banerjee, 2013). The Swajal ideology is 
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associated with self-determination and therefore has a dual association with both the Indian 
independence movement and also village self-sufficiency (Johnson et al., 2005; Banerjee, 2013). During 
the early 1990s, it was this political ideology of self-sufficiency that shaped the constitutional reforms 
that empowered the Panchayat Raj system of local self-government (Johnson et al., 2005) that is 
shaping the forms of co-produced rural water supply described above. 
So, whilst the participatory underpinning of community management in the international literature 
implicitly adopted a rivalrous distinction between community participation and government (Harvey 
and Reed, 2006), within the Indian context, community participation is not implicitly considered as 
some form of alternative to public provision, but rather as the aim of public administration. Even if this 
ambition is not often achieved in practice it remains the dominant normative position on the relations 
between state and participation which is considered to have laid the foundations for these forms of co-
production to emerge. In concluding this section on the Indian national context, the author believes 
that the forms of service delivery practised under the guise of community management in India can be 
more usefully described as co-production. There is considered to be normative and conceptual 
advantages of bringing in this concept within the Indian context, as it is considered more accurate and 
fairer in terms of describing the distribution of responsibility between citizens and supporting bodies. 
However, the specific nature of India does limit its easy transfer of these principles to broader contexts 
but withstanding these challenges, the next section still argues it still could be worthwhile. 
DOES CO-PRODUCTION HAVE VALIDITY BEYOND INDIA? 
This section now considers the validity of the arguments made in this paper beyond India. It, however, 
focuses predominantly on the sub-Saharan Africa context as this is where the most acute need remains 
in terms of basic access to rural water supply (WHO-UNICEF, 2017) and in terms of sustainability of rural 
water services (World Bank, 2017). In doing so, it is recognised that there are significant community 
management programmes operating in other contexts, some which exhibit strong co-production 
tendencies. Notable examples include the SISAR (Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation System) 
programme in Brazil that involves pooling of risk between communities through the creation of a 
federation of community associations supported by the State Water Supply and Sanitation Company, 
and the circuit rider programmes in Nicaragua and Honduras which involve highly mobile technical 
experts employed by the State providing assistance to communities (for a recent review of experiences 
from around the world, see: World Bank, 2017). Although not considered in detail in this paper, these 
cases are considered to reinforce the view that it is important to think 'beyond the community' to 
consider rural water services as a joint enterprise between state and citizens. 
Returning to earlier arguments about the distinction between collective action problems and co-
production problems (McGranahan, 2015), it is possible to highlight a fundamental difference between 
the Indian case studies and the context of community management in the context of a sub-Saharan 
Africa. That is, the cases from India focus on piped water supply which are increasingly delivering 
household or yard connections, whilst the community management approach has largely been adopted 
in a sub-Saharan African context as an approach for managing communal handpumps or public stand 
posts (McCommon et al., 1990). In the latter context, it may still hold true that collective action 
problems remain a useful analytical way of explaining the challenge at the community level; yet its 
applicability becomes less relevant for household piped water supply that demands more 
professionalised management structures but also change the psychology of using the service. This 
poses the question about whether co-production should be seen as the next stage of community 
management which develops as technological sophistication increases and people begin to receive 
household services. This may be one fruitful way of thinking about co-production in India vis-à-vis 
lower-income contexts in other regions. In a separate piece it is argued that in some wealthier parts of 
India there is a move to 'utilitisation' of services in which urban-like utility services move into rural 
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areas, particularly in the context of multi-village schemes (Hutchings et al., under consideration), and in 
that light co-production may be a transitional step between the models. More broadly, the new 
Sustainable Development Goal targets have higher ambitions to deliver safely managed water supply 
located on the premises (WHO-UNICEF, 2017), which is likely to drive greater emphasis on delivering 
these forms of household supply around the world. 
Yet sequenced theories of development have often proven inadequate in a predictive sense and so 
this thinking is not considered completely satisfactory. Rather, a discourse of co-production even in 
low-income contexts in which communal hand pumps or public stand posts are still used is considered 
valid on normative grounds. The challenges associated with management in these contexts is also likely 
to be best solved through providing highly decentralised support to community institutions and 
significant recurrent financing of supply (Stalker Prokopy and Thorsten, 2009; Lockwood and Smits, 
2011), which then makes it a form of co-production. The label is important as it helps discursively recast 
water supply as a joint responsibility between communities and higher-level actors and not just the 
responsibility of communities. This is important not only in providing fairer expectations of rural 
communities but also in terms of advocating and holding to account governments (and other agencies) 
that too often leave communities without adequate support. As a discourse co-production is 
considered to hold normative promise in how it supports sharing of responsibility between state and 
citizen. 
Thinking about these issues in a broader international context also opens up a route for further 
research. This study suggests that the ideals of community management have become co-opted and 
adapted into co-production through particular features of the Indian context. Further research 
understanding this process in India, as well as assessing whether and how this process plays out in 
other contexts, may provide insights into how internationally recognised practices can be better 
adapted into the national operating context by national and local actors. This is a particularly 
interesting question in countries with very different contexts, especially those with a smaller and less 
influential national public policy arena that may remain overly dominated by international actors. It is 
hoped that through the prism of co-production these efforts will more meaningfully focus on that 
critical relationships between community-level action and broader support systems, rather than the 
minutiae of particular intra-community interaction. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper makes the case for a realignment in the discourse and conceptualisation of community 
management of rural water supply. This is based on a twofold case. First, the discourse of community 
management is inaccurate in describing the balance of responsibility and resource contribution that is 
found in many programmes, at least as demonstrated via the case studies from India. In these cases, 
community institutions had become embedded or highly supported via the local self-government 
system. Financing of supply was also significantly subsidised by enabling support entities with 
communities covering approximately 5% of capital costs and half of recurrent costs. In practice, this 
form of service delivery is dependent on the enabling support entities and, put simply, the way we 
describe it should better reflect this. This leads to the second point. On a normative level, shifting the 
discourse is considered a fairer representation that appropriately indicates how the balance of 
responsibility should be across these scales. This point is important as it means that there is value in 
extending the notion of coproduction to other contexts to help shape and advocate for more equitable 
expectations and beliefs about the shared role of different actors in delivering rural water supply, even 
if these sorts of arrangements are not currently in practice. 
On a conceptual level, the paper makes a related point about thinking through the central problem 
of rural water-supply service delivery as a co-production challenge rather than a collective action or 
participatory community empowerment challenge. Here, the point is that collective action and 
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participatory analyses tend towards a focus on intra-community dynamics and are poorly aligned to 
contemporary challenges in the management of domestic supply, especially when dealing with 
household piped water supply. In such cases, it is better to think through the challenge as one of co-
produced service delivery involving both private citizens at the community level and broader supporting 
entities, particularly government bodies. As such, the challenge is about understanding how durable 
and productive relationships can be achieved at this level so as to produce the type of enduring social 
and technical structures that deliver effective and equitable services to populations. The India example 
has some insight here in that those types of relationships have been produced through its specific 
political economy (especially, devolution centred on the Panchayat Raj Institutions) as well as 
ideological frames (e.g. Swajal). On one level, this makes direct comparisons to other national contexts 
limited in scope, but it does indicate what is found in many other cases of successful service delivery 
programmes around the world. That is, that a process of national adaptation is likely to be an important 
step in developing workable and sustainable solutions. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Overview of case studies. 
State Name of 
programme 
Primary enabling 
support agency 
(agencies) 
Community 
service 
provider 
model 
Years since 
implement-
tation 
References 
Jharkhand  National Rural 
Drinking Water 
Programme 
(NRDWP)  
Drinking Water 
and Sanitation 
Department (State 
Government) 
Sub-
committee of 
the local self-
government 
(LSG) 
4 (Javorszky, 
Dash, and 
Panda, 2015) 
Madhya 
Pradesh  
Vasudha Vikas 
Sansthan 
Vasudha Vikas 
Sansthan (NGO) 
Registered 
society 
2 (Ramamohan 
Roa and 
Raviprakash, 
2016a) 
Odisha  Gram Vikas Gram Vikas (NGO) Registered 
society 
3 (Javorszky, 
Dash, and 
Panda, 2016) 
Chhattisgarh  NRDWP Public Health 
Engineering 
Department 
(PHED) (State 
Government) 
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
14 (Javorszky et 
al., 2015) 
Meghalaya NRDWP Dorbor (body of 
LSG system in 
tribal areas)  
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
9 (Saraswathy, 
2016b) 
Rajasthan  Swajaldhara PHED (State 
Government) 
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
6 (Harris et al., 
2016b) 
West Bengal Water for People Water for People 
(NGO) 
Registered 
society 
6 (Smits and 
Mekala, 2015) 
Telangana Bala Vikas  Bala Vikas (NGO) Registered 
society 
5 (Chary Vedala 
et al., 2016c) 
Karnataka Jal Nirmal 
(World Bank 
supported 
programme) 
Rural Drinking 
Water Supply and 
Sanitation 
Department (State 
Government) 
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
6 (Ramamohan 
Roa and 
Raviprakash, 
2016b) 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
NRDWP Irrigation and 
Public Health 
Department (State 
Government) 
Registered 
society 
6 (Smits, Shiva, 
and Kapur, 
2016) 
Punjab Punjab Rural 
Water Supply 
and Sanitation 
Department of 
Water Supply and 
Sanitation (State 
Registered 
society 
3 (Harris, Brighu, 
and Poonia, 
2016a) 
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Project (World 
Bank-supported 
programme) 
Government) 
Uttarakhand  Himmotthan 
Water Supply 
and Sanitation 
Initiative  
Himmotthan 
(NGO) 
Registered 
society 
8 (Smits, Shiva, 
and Kapur, 
2016) 
Kerala I Jalanidhi (World 
Bank- supported 
programme) 
Kerala Rural Water 
Supply and 
Sanitation Agency 
Registered 
society 
9 (Saraswathy, 
2016b) 
Kerala II NRDWP Panchayat Raj 
Institutions 
Registered 
society 
9 (Chary Vedala 
et al., 2016b) 
Gujarat I Water and 
Sanitation 
Management 
Organisation 
(WASMO) 
WASMO (State 
Government) 
Registered 
society 
11 (Chary Vedala 
et al., 2015) 
Gujarat II WASMO WASMO (State 
Government) 
Registered 
society 
6 (Chary Vedala 
et al., 2015) 
Tamil Nadu I NRDWP Tamil Nadu Water 
and Drainage 
Board (TWAD 
Board) (State 
Government) 
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
10 (Saraswathy, 
2015) 
Tamil Nadu II Hogenakkal 
Water Supply 
and Fluorosis 
Mitigation 
Project 
TWAD Board 
(State 
Government) 
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
3 (Paul. 
Hutchings, 
2015) 
Maharashtra Shahnoor Dam 
Project  
Maharashtra 
Jeevan 
Pradhikaran (MJP) 
and the 
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
14 (Chary Vedala 
et al., 2016a) 
Sikkim NRDWP Department of 
Rural 
Management and 
Development 
(State 
Government) 
Sub-
committee of 
the LSG 
5 (Saraswathy, 
2016a) 
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